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Constitutional Law-I

Constitutional law is a body of law that defines the structure, powers, and duties of a government. It establishes the fundamental principles by which a state is governed and outlines the basic rights of its citizens. The constitution serves as the supreme law of the land, to which all other laws must adhere.


Topic 1 – General

Constitution – Fundamental Law of the Land: Making of the Indian Constitution; Aims and Objectives; Essential Features of Constitution; Theory of Basic Structure; Principles of Federalism; Nature of the Indian Constitution – Federal, Unitary, Quasi-federal; Cooperative and Competitive Federalism; Scheduled and Tribal Areas 


  1. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala 1973 ( 4) SCC 225


The key issue in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru vs. State of Kerala was the extent of Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, specifically whether it could alter fundamental rights. The parties involved were Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and the State of Kerala. The Supreme Court's essential legal reasoning focused on interpreting Article 368 in the context of the Constitution's history and aspirations, ultimately establishing the "basic structure" doctrine, which limits Parliament's amending power to ensure the Constitution's core principles remain intact. The final disposition upheld the validity of the challenged amendments but restricted Parliament's power to alter the Constitution's basic structure. The judgment referenced the Golak Nath case and set a precedent for future constitutional amendments.


  1. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India 1994 (3) SCC 1


The key issue in the case of S.R. Bommai and Ors. vs. Union of India was the constitutional validity and scope of the President's power to impose President's Rule in states under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution. The parties involved were S.R. Bommai and others as appellants, and the Union of India and others as respondents. The Supreme Court emphasized that Article 356 should be used sparingly and only when the President is fully satisfied that the state government cannot function according to constitutional provisions. The court held that the President's satisfaction is subject to judicial review, but only on limited grounds such as mala fides or ultra vires actions. The final disposition was that the matters were disposed of with no order as to costs, and the court underscored the importance of maintaining the constitutional balance between the center and states. The judgment referenced the need for judicial restraint in reviewing the President's satisfaction and highlighted the importance of secularism as a basic feature of the Constitution.


  1. State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241


The key issue in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Union of India was whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, which allowed the Union to acquire land and rights vested in a State. The parties involved were the State of West Bengal and the Union of India. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Act's provisions were intended to cover land or rights in or over land belonging to both individuals and States, and that Parliament had the competence to legislate on such matters under Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the suit, upholding the validity of the Act and confirming Parliament's legislative competence.


  1. Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549


The key issue in "Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Ors. vs. The State of Punjab" was whether the Punjab Government's policy of nationalizing the publication of school textbooks, thereby excluding private publishers, violated the petitioners' rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution. The parties involved were Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others, who were private textbook publishers, and the State of Punjab. The Supreme Court reasoned that the executive power of the state includes the authority to engage in trade or business activities without specific legislative sanction, provided it does not contravene any existing law. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the government's actions did not require prior legislative approval and did not infringe upon the petitioners' constitutional rights. The judgment referenced the distribution of executive powers under Articles 73 and 162 of the Constitution and aligned with the principles of parliamentary governance.


  1. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India 2006 (7) SCC 1


The Supreme Court of India in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India addressed the constitutionality of amendments to the Representation of People Act, 1951, which removed the domicile requirement for election to the Council of States and introduced an open ballot system. The key issue was whether these amendments violated the federal structure and the principle of secrecy in voting, both considered basic features of the Constitution. The court held that the domicile requirement was not a constitutional necessity and that the open ballot system did not infringe upon the fundamental right to free expression. The court dismissed the petition, upholding the amendments, and clarified that the basic structure doctrine does not apply to ordinary legislation.


  1. State of Haryana v. State of Punjab  2002 (2) SCC 507


The Supreme Court of India addressed the dispute between the State of Haryana and the State of Punjab regarding the completion of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal, which is crucial for Haryana to receive its allocated share of Ravi-Beas waters. The court examined whether the dispute constituted a "water dispute" under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, which would bar its jurisdiction. It concluded that the issue was not a water dispute but rather about the construction of the canal, thus falling within its jurisdiction under Article 131 of the Constitution. The court issued a mandatory injunction directing Punjab to complete the canal within one year, failing which the Union Government must ensure its completion. The court emphasized the importance of cooperative federalism and the Union's role in resolving inter-state disputes.


  1. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu  2007(2) SCC 1  


The key issue in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. was whether laws added to the Ninth Schedule of the Indian Constitution after April 24, 1973, could be challenged for violating the basic structure doctrine established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala. The appellants, represented by I.R. Coelho, contended that such laws should not be immune from judicial review if they infringe fundamental rights. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, held that post-1973 amendments to the Ninth Schedule are subject to judicial review if they damage the Constitution's basic structure, emphasizing the importance of fundamental rights and judicial review as integral to the Constitution. The Court's decision reaffirmed the basic structure doctrine, allowing challenges to laws in the Ninth Schedule that violate fundamental rights, thus maintaining the balance between Parts III and IV of the Constitution.



Topic 2 – The Union and its Territory

Power to cede  Indian territory to a Foreign Nation; Power to create/extinguish a state; Alteration of name, area and boundary of existing states – Procedure (Articles 1 – 4) 


  1. In re Berubari Union & Exchg. of Enclaves AIR 1960 SC 845


The key issue in the Supreme Court of India's judgment in "In Re: The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves" was whether legislative action was necessary to implement an agreement between India and Pakistan regarding the division of Berubari Union and the exchange of enclaves. The parties involved were the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan. The Court reasoned that the agreement involved cession of Indian territory, which required constitutional amendment under Article 368, as Article 3 did not cover cession to a foreign state. The final disposition was that legislative action under Article 368 was necessary to implement the agreement. The Court referenced the need for constitutional amendment to alter India's territorial boundaries, emphasizing the sovereignty of the state in such matters.


  1. Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of India AIR 1966 SC 644  


The key issue in the case of Ram Kishore Sen and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. was whether the transfer of a portion of Berubari Union No. 12 and the village of Chilahati to Pakistan was legal. The appellants, residents of the affected areas, challenged the transfer, arguing it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, upheld the legality of the transfer, reasoning that the Ninth Amendment Act, 1960, which facilitated the transfer, was valid and that the areas in question were rightfully part of Pakistan under the Radcliffe Award. The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellants' claims, and confirmed that the transfer was consistent with the constitutional provisions and previous Supreme Court opinions.


  1. Union of India  v. Sukumar Sengupta 1990 Supp SCC 545 


The key issue in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Sukumar Sengupta and Ors. was whether the agreements between India and Bangladesh in 1974 and 1982, concerning the exchange of enclaves and the lease of the Teen Bigha corridor, amounted to a cession of Indian territory requiring constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court of India held that these agreements did not constitute a cession of territory or transfer of sovereignty, as India retained sovereignty over the area. The Court modified the Calcutta High Court's decision, stating that no constitutional amendment was necessary since the Ninth Amendment had not come into effect. The appeal was allowed to the extent of deleting the High Court's directions for constitutional amendment and land acquisition.


  1. N. M. Sahib v. Chief Comnr. Pondicherry  AIR 1962 SC 797  


The key issue in the case of N. Masthan Sahib vs. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, was whether Pondicherry was part of the territory of India, affecting the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to entertain appeals and writ petitions under Articles 136 and 32 of the Constitution. The appellants, N. Masthan Sahib and Sivarama Reddiar, challenged orders by the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry regarding motor vehicle permits. The Supreme Court sought clarification from the Government of India, which confirmed that Pondicherry was not part of Indian territory, being administered under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals and writ petitions due to lack of jurisdiction, while suggesting legislative action to address the jurisdictional anomaly.


  1. R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324


The Supreme Court of India addressed two key constitutional questions in the case of R.C. Poudyal and Ors. vs. Union of India: whether seats can be reserved in a state legislature for a religious group and whether seats can be reserved for a tribe in excess of its population. The petitioners, including R.C. Poudyal, challenged the reservation of seats in the Sikkim Legislative Assembly for Bhutia-Lepchas and the Sangha, arguing it violated constitutional principles. The court held that the reservation for Bhutia-Lepchas was justified due to historical and demographic reasons, but the reservation for the Sangha, based on religious grounds, was unconstitutional. The court struck down the provisions for the Sangha seat, while upholding the reservation for Bhutia-Lepchas, emphasizing the need to maintain the secular character of the Constitution.


  1. Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 51  


The key issue in the case of Babulal Parate vs. The State of Bombay and Ors. was whether the formation of a composite State of Bombay under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, violated Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, particularly regarding the requirement for state legislatures to express their views on proposals affecting state boundaries. The parties involved were Babulal Parate (appellant) and the State of Bombay along with others (respondents). The Supreme Court reasoned that Article 3's proviso required only that the original proposal in the Bill be referred to the state legislature, not any subsequent amendments, and that the legislative process was duly followed. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of the Act, and emphasized that the legislative procedure did not contravene constitutional provisions.



Topic 3 – The Union and the State Executives

  1. The President and Vice President – Qualifications, Election, Term of Office, Powers, Impeachment (Articles 52-72); Governor – Appointment - Term of Office – Removal and Powers (Articles 153 – 161) 

  2. Nature, Scope and Extent of Executive Powers of the Union and States (Article 73, 162) 

  3. Union Council of Ministers – Powers and Position of the President (Articles 74-75); State Council of Ministers (Articles 163-164); Relationship of the President/Governor with the Council of Ministers; Scope and Extent of Judicial Review of Executive Actions (Articles 74, 75, 77, 78, 111, 102, 103(2), 217(3), 163).


  1. B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331 


The key issue in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India was whether the President's power to remove a Governor under Article 156(1) of the Indian Constitution is absolute or subject to limitations. The parties involved were B.P. Singhal as the appellant and the Union of India as the respondent. The Supreme Court held that while a Governor holds office at the President's pleasure, this power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously and must be based on valid and compelling reasons. The Court clarified that a Governor cannot be removed merely for being out of sync with the Union Government's policies or due to a change in the central government. The decision is subject to limited judicial review to ensure it is not arbitrary or mala fide. The appeal was disposed of with these clarifications, emphasizing the need for fairness in the exercise of the President's pleasure.


  1. U. N. R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi  (1971) 2 SCC 63


The key issue in the case of U.N.A. Rao vs. Indira Gandhi was whether the dissolution of the House of the People under Article 85(2) of the Indian Constitution necessitated the resignation or dismissal of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, as argued by U.N.A. Rao. The Supreme Court, involving parties U.N.A. Rao and Indira Gandhi, reasoned that Article 74(1) mandates the existence of a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President, and this requirement persists even when the House is dissolved. The Court concluded that Article 75(3), which requires the Council of Ministers to be collectively responsible to the House of the People, does not apply during dissolution. The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs, affirming that the Prime Minister could continue in office during the dissolution period.


  1. S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda (1996) 6 SCC 734


The key issue in the case of S.P. Anand vs. H.D. Deve Gowda and others was whether a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament can be appointed as the Prime Minister of India. The petitioner, S.P. Anand, challenged the appointment of H.D. Deve Gowda as Prime Minister, arguing it violated constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court, referencing previous decisions and Articles 74 and 75 of the Constitution, held that a non-member could be appointed as Prime Minister for up to six months, provided they secure election to either House within that period. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming the constitutionality of such appointments and vacating any interim orders.


  1. Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831


The key issue in the case of Shamsher Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab was whether the Governor of Punjab could terminate the services of subordinate judges on probation without personally exercising this power, relying instead on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The appellants, Shamsher Singh and Ishwar Chand Aggarwal, argued that such powers should be exercised personally by the Governor under Article 234 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, held that the Governor, as the constitutional head of the state, exercises such powers on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, not personally, aligning with the parliamentary system of governance. The appeals were dismissed, affirming the termination orders, and the court clarified that the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not personal but constitutional, following the Cabinet system.


  1. M.P. Spl. Police Estab. v. State of M.P (2004) 8 SCC 788


The key issue in the case of Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. was whether the Governor could grant sanction for prosecution of ministers against the advice of the Council of Ministers. The parties involved were the Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment and the State of Madhya Pradesh, with ministers Rajender Kumar Singh and Bisahu Ram Yadav as respondents. The Supreme Court reasoned that while the Governor typically acts on the advice of the Council, exceptions exist where the Governor can act independently, especially in cases of apparent bias or irrational decisions by the Council. The Court found the Council's refusal to grant sanction irrational and upheld the Governor's decision to grant it. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's decisions were set aside, and the prosecution was directed to proceed expeditiously.


  1. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501


Dipak Misra, C.J.I., A.K. Sikri and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.: The Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutional status and governance structure of the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi in the case between the Government of NCT of Delhi and the Union of India. The core issue was whether the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of Delhi. The Court held that while the NCT of Delhi is not a full-fledged state, it has a unique status with a legislative assembly and a council of ministers. The Lieutenant Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in matters where he is required to act in his discretion. The Court emphasized the principles of collaborative federalism and constitutional morality, stating that the Lieutenant Governor should not act as an obstructionist and should refer matters to the President only in exceptional cases. The appeal was disposed of by clarifying the roles and powers of the Delhi government and the Lieutenant Governor, reinforcing the democratic setup intended by the constitutional amendment.


Justice Ashok Bhushan addressed the legal question of the distribution of powers between the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) and the Lieutenant Governor (LG) under Article 239AA of the Indian Constitution. He reasoned that while the GNCTD has legislative and executive powers over matters in the State and Concurrent Lists, the LG is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in cases where he decides to refer a matter to the President. Justice Bhushan concurred with the main judgment, emphasizing that the LG's power to refer matters should not be exercised routinely and that the GNCTD's decisions do not require the LG's concurrence. The judgment reinforced the constitutional scheme of governance for Delhi, ensuring the LG's oversight while respecting the democratic mandate of the GNCTD.


Justice Ashok Bhushan, in his opinion, addressed the legal question of the extent of executive powers of the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) vis-à-vis the Lieutenant Governor (LG) under Article 239AA of the Constitution. He concluded that the "aid and advice" of the Council of Ministers is binding on the LG, except when the LG decides to refer a matter to the President under the proviso to Article 239AA(4). Justice Bhushan emphasized that the LG should not act as an adversary but as a facilitator, and the requirement to communicate decisions to the LG does not imply the need for his concurrence. He concurred with the main judgment, advocating for a harmonious and collaborative approach to governance in the NCT of Delhi, and instructed that the matters be placed before the appropriate regular Bench for further proceedings.


Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud addressed the constitutional status of the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi, focusing on the interpretation of Article 239AA, which provides for a legislative assembly and a Council of Ministers for Delhi. The key legal question was the extent of the Lieutenant Governor's power to refer matters to the President under the proviso to Article 239AA(4). Justice Chandrachud emphasized the need for a balance between the Union's interests and the democratic governance of Delhi, advocating for a cooperative approach where the Lieutenant Governor should refer matters to the President only in exceptional cases of national interest. He concurred with the main judgment, supporting a harmonious interpretation that respects both the special status of Delhi and the principles of representative government.


  1. Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P 2006 (3) SCC (CRI) 438


The key issue in "Epuru Sudhakar and Ors. vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors." was whether the Governor of Andhra Pradesh's decision to grant remission of the unexpired sentence of Gowru Venkata Reddy under Article 161 of the Constitution was valid. The appellants, Epuru Sudhakar and others, challenged this remission, arguing it was based on irrelevant and extraneous materials and lacked proper consideration. The Supreme Court emphasized that the exercise of pardon or remission powers is subject to limited judicial review, particularly if exercised arbitrarily or with mala fide intent. The Court found that the Governor's decision was not made with due consideration of relevant materials and set aside the remission order, directing a reconsideration of the petition for pardon. The judgment referenced precedents like Maru Ram v. Union of India and Kehar Singh v. Union of India, underscoring the need for guidelines to prevent misuse of such powers.



Topic 4 – Parliament and State Legislatures

Composition of Parliament and State legislatures; Qualification/Disqualification of Members; Legislative Procedure, Legislative Privilege (Articles 79 – 122, 168 – 212) 


  1. S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda, (1996) 6 SCC 734 


The key issue in the case of S.P. Anand vs. H.D. Deve Gowda and others was whether a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament can be appointed as the Prime Minister of India. The petitioner, S.P. Anand, challenged the appointment of H.D. Deve Gowda as Prime Minister, arguing it violated constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court, referencing previous decisions and Articles 74 and 75 of the Constitution, held that a non-member could be appointed as Prime Minister for up to six months, provided they secure election to either House within that period. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming the constitutionality of such appointments and vacating any interim orders.


  1. B. R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 7 SCC 231


Justice Brijesh Kumar concurred with the main judgment by Justice Bharucha, addressing the legal question of whether a writ of quo warranto could challenge the appointment of a Chief Minister by the Governor under Article 361 of the Constitution. He reasoned that Article 361, which protects the Governor from being answerable to any court, does not extend immunity to the appointee if they are not legally entitled to hold the office. Justice Kumar emphasized that the writ of quo warranto is directed at the individual holding the office, not the appointing authority, and concluded that the Governor's appointment does not preclude judicial review of the appointee's qualifications.


Justice G.B. Pattanaik concurred with the judgment of Justice Bharucha, addressing whether a disqualified individual, whose election nomination was rejected due to a criminal conviction, could be appointed as Chief Minister under Article 164 of the Indian Constitution. Justice Pattanaik reasoned that despite Article 164 not specifying qualifications, the qualifications and disqualifications in Articles 173 and 191 must be read into it, preventing such an appointment. He emphasized that constitutional provisions and the rule of law must prevail over the will of the majority. The judgment concluded with a call for legislative reform to address corruption in politics.


S.P. Bharucha, J.: The Supreme Court of India addressed whether Ms. J. Jayalalitha, convicted of criminal offenses and sentenced to imprisonment, could be sworn in and continue as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The court held that under Article 164 of the Constitution, a person must be qualified to be a member of the legislature and not disqualified under Article 191 to be appointed as a minister. Since Jayalalitha was disqualified under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act due to her conviction, her appointment was invalid. The court quashed her appointment but invoked the de facto doctrine to validate actions taken by her government during her tenure.


  1. Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) 7 SCC 653


The key issue in the case of Lily Thomas vs. Union of India was whether Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which allowed sitting members of Parliament or State Legislatures to avoid disqualification upon conviction if they filed an appeal within three months, was constitutional. The parties involved were Lily Thomas and the Union of India. The Supreme Court reasoned that Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution require the same disqualifications for being chosen as, and for being, a member of Parliament or State Legislature, and that Parliament cannot defer the effect of disqualification. The Court declared Sub-section (4) of Section 8 ultra vires the Constitution, meaning it was beyond Parliament's powers and thus invalid. The Court allowed the writ petitions, but protected current members who had already filed appeals from immediate disqualification.


  1. Lok Prahari (through General Secretary SN Shukla) v. Election Commission of India (2018)18 SCC 114 

     

In the case of Lok Prahari vs. Election Commission of India and Others, the Supreme Court addressed whether a stay of conviction by an appellate court nullifies the disqualification of a legislator under Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Lok Prahari, a registered society, argued that disqualification should remain effective from the date of conviction, despite any stay. The Court, referencing precedents like Lily Thomas and Ravi Kant Patil, held that a stay of conviction prevents the disqualification from operating. The petition was dismissed, affirming the appellate court's power to stay convictions and the Election Commission's existing procedures.


  1. Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 (Re Gujarat Assembly Election Matter) (2002) 8 SCC 237


  1. Anil Kumar Jha v. Union of India (2005) 3 SCC 150


The key issue in the case of Anil Kumar Jha and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. was whether the appointment of a Protem Speaker and potential nomination of an Anglo-Indian member to the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly were constitutionally valid, given the political context and pending writ of quo warranto against the Chief Minister. The Supreme Court, referencing the precedent in Jagdambika Pal v. Union of India, ordered an interim measure for a floor test on March 11, 2005, to determine the majority in the Assembly, ensuring the process was peaceful and without interference. The court directed that no nominations under Article 333 occur before the floor test and requested video recording of the proceedings, with the matter listed for further hearing on March 14, 2005.


  1. Jaya Bachchan v. Union of India  (2006) 5 SCC 266  


The key issue in the case of Jaya Bachchan vs. Union of India was whether Jaya Bachchan's appointment as Chairperson of the Uttar Pradesh Film Development Council constituted holding an "office of profit" under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution, leading to her disqualification from the Rajya Sabha. The parties involved were Jaya Bachchan and the Union of India. The Supreme Court reasoned that the office carried entitlements such as a monthly honorarium, allowances, and other benefits, which constituted pecuniary gain, thus qualifying as an office of profit regardless of whether she actually received these benefits. The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding her disqualification. The decision referenced precedents like Ravanna Subanna and Shibu Soren, emphasizing that the potential for pecuniary gain, not actual receipt, determines an office of profit.


  1. Consumer Education and Research Society v. Union of India & Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 648  


The Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutional validity of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Act, 2006, which retrospectively exempted certain offices from disqualifying their holders as Members of Parliament. The key issue was whether this retrospective exemption violated Articles 101 to 104 of the Constitution. The petitioners, Consumer Education and Research Society, argued that the amendment was unconstitutional and violated Article 14. The court, referencing precedents like Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, held that Parliament has the power to enact laws with retrospective effect, including those removing disqualifications. The court found no violation of Article 14 or constitutional conventions and dismissed the writ petitions, upholding the amendment's validity.


  1. In re Keshav Singh AIR 1965 SC 745


The core issue in this Supreme Court of India judgment was whether the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly had the privilege to commit a person for contempt by a general warrant and if such a warrant could be reviewed by the courts. The parties involved were the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly and the High Court of Uttar Pradesh, with Keshav Singh, B. Solomon, and Justices N. U. Beg and G. D. Sahgal being central figures. The court reasoned that the Assembly's privilege to commit for contempt by a general warrant was not absolute and could not override the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to personal liberty and judicial review. The final disposition was that the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain Keshav Singh's petition and that neither the judges nor the advocate committed contempt of the Assembly. The court emphasized the harmonious construction of constitutional provisions, ensuring that privileges do not infringe upon fundamental rights.


  1. Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha  (2007) 3 SCC 184


Justice R.V. Raveendran, J. addressed whether the Indian Parliament has the constitutional power to expel its members, a power claimed under Article 105(3) as part of parliamentary privileges. He argued that Articles 101 and 102 of the Constitution exhaustively list the circumstances under which a parliamentary seat becomes vacant, and expulsion is not included. Justice Raveendran dissented from the majority opinion, concluding that the expulsion of members was unconstitutional and invalid, and that the petitioners should continue as members of Parliament unless disqualified by other constitutional means.


Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J.: The Supreme Court of India addressed whether the Houses of Parliament have the power to expel members under Article 105 of the Constitution, and if such power is subject to judicial review. The case involved Ram Pal and others against the Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, and others, following allegations of MPs accepting money for parliamentary questions. The Court held that Parliament does possess the power to expel members as part of its privileges, and this power is not inconsistent with other constitutional provisions. However, the exercise of this power is subject to judicial review to ensure it is not arbitrary or unconstitutional. The Court dismissed the petitions challenging the expulsions, affirming the decisions of the respective Houses. 



Topic 5 - Legislative Power of the Executive (Ordinances)

Essential conditions for promulgation of an Ordinance: ‘Ordinance’ under Article 13; Judicial Review; Validity of successive promulgation of the same Ordinance (Articles 123, 213)


  1. D. C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 378


The key issue in the case of D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. was whether the Governor of Bihar could repromulgate ordinances indefinitely without legislative approval, effectively bypassing the legislative process. The petitioners, including D.C. Wadhwa, challenged the constitutional validity of this practice and specific ordinances affecting their rights. The Supreme Court held that the practice of repromulgating ordinances without legislative enactment was unconstitutional, emphasizing that ordinances are meant for immediate action when the legislature is not in session. The court dismissed the respondents' objections regarding the petitioners' locus standi, affirming the right of citizens to challenge unconstitutional practices. The court's decision reinforced the principle that governance must adhere to constitutional provisions, referencing the precedent set in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India.


  1. A. K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271


The Supreme Court of India in A.K. Roy and Ors. vs. Union of India addressed the validity of the National Security Ordinance, 1980, and the National Security Act, 1980, focusing on the ordinance-making power of the President under Article 123 of the Constitution. The key issue was whether this power is legislative or executive and if it can be used to deprive individuals of life or liberty. The court held that the ordinance-making power is legislative, equating ordinances with laws made by Parliament, and thus subject to the same constitutional constraints, including fundamental rights. The court dismissed the petitions, upholding the validity of the ordinance and the Act, and declined to issue a mandamus to enforce the 44th Constitutional Amendment, which was not yet in force. The judgment referenced the Bearer Bonds case and emphasized the legislative nature of ordinances, rejecting the argument that they violate the separation of powers.


  1. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar  (2017) 3 SCC 1 


Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud addressed whether the seven successive repromulgations of the Bihar Non-Government Sanskrit Schools Ordinance, 1989, were unconstitutional. He concluded that these repromulgations constituted a fraud on the Constitution, as they bypassed the legislative process by not being tabled before the Bihar Legislative Assembly, violating Article 213(2). Justice Chandrachud concurred with the High Court's decision, which declared the ordinances unconstitutional, and agreed with the direction that no recovery of salaries paid to employees should be made. The judgment overruled previous decisions that allowed enduring rights from lapsed ordinances, emphasizing legislative supremacy and the mandatory nature of laying ordinances before the legislature.


Justice T.S. Thakur, C.J.I., addressed the legal question of whether the re-promulgation of ordinances by the State of Bihar was constitutionally valid. He emphasized the importance of legislative accountability and the temporary nature of ordinances, reasoning that repeated re-promulgation undermines the constitutional framework. Justice Thakur concurred with the main judgment, agreeing that the practice was unconstitutional, and supported the directive for legislative scrutiny to prevent misuse of ordinance-making powers.


Madan B. Lokur, J.: The Supreme Court of India addressed whether the failure to lay an Ordinance before the State Legislature under Article 213(2) of the Constitution renders it ineffective. The case involved Krishna Kumar Singh and others against the State of Bihar and others. The Court held that laying an Ordinance before the Legislature is not mandatory, and its failure does not invalidate the Ordinance. However, an Ordinance cannot create enduring rights, and the re-promulgation of Ordinances should not be mechanical. The Court upheld the High Court's decision to strike down the fourth and subsequent Ordinances due to inadequate justification by the State of Bihar, while assuming the validity of the first three unchallenged Ordinances. The appeal was partly allowed, with directions for payment of salary and interest as ordered by the High Court.



Topic 6 – Union and State Judiciary

Part-I Composition, Appointment, Removal and Jurisdiction 165 

  1. The Union Judiciary: the Supreme Court of India (Articles 124-147); Composition, Appointment and Removal of Judges (Articles 124-130); Procedure (Article 145); the High Courts in the States (Articles 214-231) 


  1. Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth (1977) 4 SCC 193  


The key issue in the case of Union of India vs. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth and Ors. was the constitutionality of a presidential notification transferring Justice Sheth from the Gujarat High Court to the Andhra Pradesh High Court without his consent, raising questions about judicial independence and the requirement of effective consultation under Article 222(1) of the Indian Constitution. The parties involved were the Union of India and Justice Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth. The Supreme Court noted that the parties had reached a settlement, whereby the government agreed to transfer Justice Sheth back to the Gujarat High Court, leading to the withdrawal of the writ petition. The appeal was disposed of in terms of the settlement, with no further legal reasoning or precedents discussed in the judgment.


  1. S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) Supp SCC 87


The Supreme Court of India in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India addressed the key issue of judicial independence concerning the transfer and appointment of judges, particularly the constitutional validity of a circular issued by the Law Minister and the practice of appointing additional judges. The parties involved were S.P. Gupta and others against the Union of India and others. The Court's legal reasoning emphasized the importance of maintaining judicial independence and the need for full and effective consultation in judicial appointments. The final disposition included the dismissal of the writ petitions challenging the circular and the practice of appointing additional judges, while also recognizing the standing of public interest litigants in certain cases. The judgment referenced the importance of public interest litigation in ensuring access to justice for disadvantaged groups.


  1. SC Advocates on Record Association v. UOI (1993) 4 SCC 441


The Supreme Court of India in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and Ors. vs. Union of India addressed the issue of judicial appointments and the primacy of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in this process. The court examined whether the CJI's opinion should have primacy over the executive in appointing judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts. The court overruled the majority view in S.P. Gupta's case, which had given primacy to the executive, and held that the CJI's opinion, formed collectively with senior judges, should have primacy. The court also ruled that the issue of judge strength in High Courts is justiciable, meaning it can be reviewed by the judiciary. The decision emphasized the independence of the judiciary as a basic feature of the Constitution, ensuring that judicial appointments are not solely at the discretion of the executive.


  1. In re Special Reference No. 1 of 1998  (1998) 7 SCC 739 


The key issue in this Supreme Court of India judgment was the interpretation of the constitutional provisions regarding the appointment and transfer of judges, specifically the role and consultation process involving the Chief Justice of India (CJI). The parties involved were the President of India, who made the reference, and the Supreme Court. The court emphasized that the CJI must consult a collegium of senior judges in forming opinions on judicial appointments and transfers, ensuring a collective decision-making process. The final disposition clarified that the CJI's recommendations must be made in consultation with senior judges, and any recommendations made without following this process are not binding on the government. The judgment reinforced the principles established in the "Second Judges Case" and provided guidelines for the consultation process, ensuring transparency and reducing arbitrariness in judicial appointments and transfers.


  1. SC Adv. on Record Association v. Union of India 2016 (5) SCC 1


The Supreme Court of India in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association and Ors. vs. Union of India addressed the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014. The key issue was whether these amendments, which sought to change the process of appointing judges to the higher judiciary, violated the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining judicial independence. The court examined the role of the judiciary and the executive in judicial appointments, referencing past judgments like the Second and Third Judges cases. Ultimately, the court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration, emphasizing the need to balance judicial independence with accountability.


  1. Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India through its Registrar (2018) 8 SCC 396  


A.K. Sikri, J.: The Supreme Court of India addressed the issue of whether the Chief Justice's role as the "Master of Roster" should be interpreted to mean a collegium of the five senior-most judges for case allocation. The petitioner, Shanti Bhushan, argued for a more transparent system to prevent potential bias in case assignments. The Court reaffirmed that the Chief Justice, as the senior-most judge, holds the prerogative to allocate cases, emphasizing that this role is essential for judicial discipline and efficient court functioning. The Court dismissed the petition, maintaining the established practice and rejecting the proposal to redefine the Chief Justice's role as a collegium.


Justice Ashok Bhushan concurred with Justice A.K. Sikri's opinion, addressing the petition challenging the Chief Justice of India's exclusive authority to allocate cases and constitute benches. The petitioner sought to redefine this power as a collegium of five senior judges, citing concerns over transparency and fairness. Justice Bhushan emphasized the constitutional and conventional basis for the Chief Justice's prerogative, rejecting the petitioner's proposal and affirming the established practice. The writ petition was disposed of, maintaining the Chief Justice's role as the master of the roster, with no changes to the current system.


  1. National Judicial Appointment Commission 



b) Jurisdiction of Supreme Court: Original Exclusive (Articles 71, 131), Original Concurrent Jurisdiction of Supreme Court and High Courts (Articles 32, 226). 

c) Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court: Civil, Criminal and in other matters (Articles.132-135); Enlargement of Jurisdiction (Article 138); Binding nature of the law declared by the Supreme Court, enforcement of decrees and orders, (Articles 141 and 142) 

d) Special Leave to Appeal (Article 136) 

e) Power of Review (Article 137) 


  1. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261


The Supreme Court of India in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India addressed whether Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d) of the Constitution, which allow for the exclusion of High Court jurisdiction in favor of Tribunals, violate the basic structure doctrine by undermining judicial review. The parties involved were L. Chandra Kumar and the Union of India. The Court held that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution, and while Tribunals can supplement the High Courts, they cannot replace them entirely. The Court concluded that the power of judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court cannot be ousted, and thus, the provisions were unconstitutional to the extent they excluded such jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed, and the decision in S.P. Sampath Kumar was overruled to the extent it conflicted with this judgment.


  1. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 1


J.S. Khehar, J.: The Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutional validity of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005, challenged by the Madras Bar Association against the Union of India. The core issue was whether the Act violated the basic structure of the Constitution by transferring judicial functions from High Courts to the National Tax Tribunal (NTT). The Court held that while Parliament can create tribunals, the NTT Act failed to ensure the tribunal's independence and competence equivalent to High Courts, thus violating the Constitution's basic structure. Consequently, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 13 of the NTT Act were declared unconstitutional, rendering the entire Act invalid.


Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, J., addressed the constitutional validity of the National Tax Tribunals Act, 2005, focusing on whether a tribunal can replace the High Court in deciding substantial questions of law. He emphasized that such questions are a core judicial function of superior courts, which cannot be usurped by tribunals, as it would violate the separation of powers and judicial independence. Justice Nariman concurred with the petitioners' second contention, declaring the Act unconstitutional and reinforcing the exclusive domain of superior courts in deciding substantial legal questions.


  1. Mohd. Arif v. The Reg. Supreme Court of India  (2014) 9 SCC 737

     

Jasti Chelameswar, J.: The Supreme Court of India addressed the legal question of whether the appellants, Mohd. Arif and others, were entitled to certain procedural rights in their case against the Registrar, Supreme Court of India, and others. The court examined the procedural fairness and the appellants' right to a review of their case. The court's reasoning focused on ensuring that the principles of natural justice were upheld, emphasizing the importance of a fair hearing. The final disposition was that the appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming the procedures followed by the Registrar. The judgment did not specify further actions or reference any particular precedents.


Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman dissented from the majority opinion, arguing against the requirement for open court hearings for review petitions in death penalty cases, which are typically decided by circulation. He emphasized that Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which protects life and personal liberty, does not mandate oral hearings in every review case, as the existing safeguards and judicial discretion are sufficient. Justice Nariman maintained that the Supreme Court's rules, which allow for review petitions to be disposed of by circulation, are constitutional and do not violate the principles of natural justice. He concluded with a full dissent, advocating for the continuation of the current practice without mandatory oral hearings in review petitions for death penalty cases.



f) Advisory Jurisdiction (Article 143) 

g) Curative Petition 


  1. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388


The key issue in "Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Ors." was whether an aggrieved person can seek relief against a final judgment of the Supreme Court after a review petition is dismissed, either under Article 32 of the Constitution or otherwise. The Supreme Court, involving parties Rupa Ashok Hurra and Ashok Hurra, concluded that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to co-ordinate or superior courts, including the Supreme Court itself, as it is not subordinate to any other court. The court reaffirmed that judicial orders do not violate fundamental rights and are not subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 32. The final disposition was that the writ petitions were not maintainable, and the court emphasized that its judgments cannot be challenged under Articles 14 or 21, referencing precedents like Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and A.R. Antulay.


  1. Zakarius Lakra v. Union of India  (2005) 3 SCC 161  


The key issue in the case of Zakarius Lakra and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. was whether the death sentence imposed on the appellant should be modified to life imprisonment due to his alleged juvenile status at the time of the offense. The petitioners, parents of the appellant, presented school certificates indicating the appellant was a juvenile, which were not considered in previous proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition under Article 32 as not maintainable, citing the decision in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, and allowed the petitioners to convert it into a curative petition. The court referenced precedents where juvenile status was considered for the first time and noted these should be considered in the curative petition.


h) Writs – habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari 




Part-II Procedural requirements and innovations 


a) Judicial Activism and overreach/self-restraint, Locus Standi, Laches, Res Judicata, Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies and Public Interest Litigation – PIL (Concept of pro bono public) 


  1. Daryao v. State of UP AIR 1961 SC 1457 


The key issue in the case of Daryao and Ors. vs. The State of U.P. and Ors. was whether the principle of res judicata applies to bar a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution if a similar petition has been dismissed by a High Court under Article 226. The Supreme Court held that if a writ petition under Article 226 is dismissed on merits, it constitutes a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same relief. However, if the dismissal was due to laches or availability of an alternative remedy, it does not bar a subsequent Article 32 petition. The Court dismissed the petitions of Daryao and others, as their previous petitions were dismissed on merits, thus invoking res judicata. The Court referenced the principle of res judicata as a matter of public policy, emphasizing the finality of judicial decisions.


  1. Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969)1 SCC 110  


The key issue in Tilokchand and Motichand and Ors. vs. H.B. Munshi and Ors. was whether a petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution should be dismissed due to delay. The appellants, Tilokchand and Motichand, sought relief from a forfeiture order under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, claiming it violated their fundamental rights. The Supreme Court, with a divided bench, ultimately dismissed the petition, agreeing with Justices Bachawat and Mitter that the petitioners had not acted promptly and that the principles of limitation and delay should apply even to Article 32 petitions. The court emphasized that while no statutory limitation period applies to Article 32, claims should be pursued with diligence, and unreasonable delay could bar relief.


  1. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161  


The Supreme Court of India in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India addressed the issue of bonded laborers working under inhumane conditions in stone quarries. The petitioner, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, an organization advocating for the release of bonded laborers, alleged that workers were being exploited and deprived of their fundamental rights. The Court emphasized the constitutional mandate to eradicate bonded labor and directed the government to ensure the implementation of labor laws, provide minimum wages, and improve working conditions. The Court appointed a commissioner to investigate and report on the conditions of the laborers, underscoring the judiciary's role in safeguarding fundamental rights. The petition was allowed, and specific directions were issued to the government for the welfare and rehabilitation of the laborers.



b) Power to issue appropriate orders and directions; Power to award Compensation 


  1. Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086 


The key issue in "Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Ors." was whether the petitioner, Rudul Sah, was entitled to compensation for his unlawful detention for over 14 years after being acquitted. The Supreme Court of India addressed the State of Bihar's failure to release Sah and the lack of explanation for his prolonged detention. The Court held that compensation was warranted for the violation of Sah's fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The final disposition ordered the State of Bihar to pay Rs. 30,000 as interim compensation, in addition to Rs. 5,000 already paid, while allowing Sah to pursue further damages through a civil suit.


  1. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 1086 


The key issue in the case of M.C. Mehta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. was whether Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries, a private corporation, could be held liable under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution for the escape of oleum gas, which posed a threat to public health and safety. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati, considered the applicability of Article 21 against private entities and the extent of liability for hazardous industries. The Court established a principle of absolute liability for enterprises engaged in hazardous activities, holding them responsible for any harm caused, without exceptions. However, the Court did not make a definitive ruling on whether Shriram was an "authority" under Article 12, leaving the question open for future consideration. The Court directed the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board to file compensation claims on behalf of the victims and instructed the Delhi Administration to fund these actions, with the High Court to expedite the trials. The writ petition was scheduled for further hearing on relocation and other issues on February 3, 1987. 



Topic 7 – Distribution of Legislative Powers (14 Classes) 

Articles 245 – 255, Schedule VII 

  1. Doctrine of Territorial Nexus (Article 245) 


  1. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 452  


The key issue in "The Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar" was whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as amended, was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature, particularly concerning the definition and situs of "sale" for tax purposes. The parties involved were The Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (appellant) and The State of Bihar (respondent). The Supreme Court upheld the Act, reasoning that the tax was on the sale of goods, not on production or manufacture, and that the nexus theory applied, allowing Bihar to tax sales where goods were manufactured or present in the state. The final disposition was that the appeals were dismissed with costs, affirming the High Court's decision. The judgment referenced the applicability of the nexus theory to sales tax legislation, aligning with precedents like the United Motors case.


  1. State of Bombay v. R. M. D. C. AIR 1957 SC 699


The key issue in "The State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala" was whether the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax (Amendment) Act, 1952, was constitutionally valid, particularly concerning its application to prize competitions conducted outside Bombay. The parties involved were the State of Bombay and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, who managed a prize competition through a company in Mysore. The Supreme Court examined whether the Act was within the legislative competence of the State under Entry 34 of the State List, whether it imposed a tax exceeding constitutional limits under Article 276(2), and if it violated Articles 19(1)(g) and 301 regarding trade and commerce. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding the Act's tax provisions invalid as they exceeded constitutional limits and imposed unreasonable restrictions on trade, thus dismissing the State's appeal.


  1. State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi  AIR1959 SC 1002 


The key issue in this case was whether the Srimati Charusila Trust was a private trust for a family idol, exempt from the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, or a public trust subject to the Act. The parties involved were the State of Bihar and others as appellants, and Charusila Dasi as the respondent. The Supreme Court of India found that the trust was of a public nature, as it included provisions for public worship and charitable activities, such as a hospital and dispensary, indicating public interest. The Court also held that the Act applied to trusts situated in Bihar, even if some properties were outside the state, due to sufficient territorial connection. The appeal was allowed, reversing the High Court's decision, and the petition by Charusila Dasi was dismissed with costs.


  1. G.V.K. Industries v. Income Tax Officer (2011) 4 SCC 36 


The key issue in the case of GVK Inds. Ltd. and Ors. vs. The Income Tax Officer and Ors. was whether the Indian Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact legislation concerning extra-territorial aspects or causes that do not have any impact on or nexus with India. The Supreme Court of India, led by Justice B. Sudershan Reddy, concluded that Parliament is restricted from legislating on extra-territorial matters unless they have a real or expected impact on India or its inhabitants. The Court emphasized that legislative powers must be exercised for the benefit of India, and any laws made for foreign territories without such a nexus would be ultra vires. The appeal was ordered to be listed before an appropriate bench for disposal.



    b) Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament/Legislatures of States; Position of Union Territories (Article 246) 


    c) Interpretation of legislative lists: 

• Plenary and Ancillary Power of Legislation 

• Effect of Non Obstante Clause 

• Doctrine of Harmonious Construction


  1. In Re C P & Berar Sales of Motor Spirit & Lubricants Taxation Act,1938  AIR 1939 FE 1 


  1. Gujarat University v. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar  AIR 1963 SC 703 


The key issue in "The Gujarat University, Ahmedabad vs. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar and Ors." was whether the Gujarat University had the authority to impose Gujarati or Hindi as the exclusive medium of instruction and examination in affiliated colleges under the Gujarat University Act, 1949. The parties involved were the Gujarat University and Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar, representing his son Shrikant. The Supreme Court held that the University did not have the power to impose an exclusive medium of instruction, as the Act only allowed for promoting the use of Gujarati or Hindi as one of several media. The Court also addressed the legislative competence, stating that the power to legislate on the medium of instruction in higher education institutions falls under the Union's jurisdiction for coordination and determination of standards, as per Entry 66 of List I of the Constitution. The appeal by the University was dismissed, and the High Court's decision to issue writs against the University was upheld.


• Doctrine of Pith and Substance 


  1. Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna AIR 1947 PC 60


  1. State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla AIR 1959 SC 544 


The key issue in the case of The State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla and Ors. was whether the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952, was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The parties involved were the State of Rajasthan (formerly Ajmer) and G. Chawla and others. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Act's pith and substance related to public health and tranquility, falling under the State List, rather than the Union List's Entry on broadcasting and communication. The Court allowed the appeal, reversing the Judicial Commissioner's decision, and declared the Act intra vires the State Legislature, but noted no retrial or further prosecution would occur.


  1. State of Karnataka v. Drive-in Enterprises (2001) 4 SCC 60 


The key issue in this case was whether the Karnataka State Legislature had the competence to levy an entertainment tax on the admission of cars into a Drive-in-Theatre under Entry 62 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The parties involved were the State of Karnataka and others (appellants) and Drive-in-Enterprises (respondent). The Supreme Court reasoned that the levy was, in essence, on the person entertained, who enjoys the film with the comfort of sitting in a car, rather than on the car itself. The Court applied the doctrine of pith and substance, determining that the levy was valid as it fell within the legislative competence of the State. The final disposition was that the appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed.


• Colourable Exercise of Legislative Power 


  1. K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa AIR 1953 SC 375 


The key issue in the case of K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo and Ors. vs. The State of Orissa was the constitutional validity of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1952, which aimed to abolish zamindari and proprietary estates in Orissa. The appellants, including K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo, challenged the Act, arguing it was unconstitutional, particularly concerning compensation provisions and the impact of related tax amendments. The Supreme Court, referencing prior judgments on similar statutes, upheld the Act's validity, dismissing the appeals. The court emphasized that the doctrine of "colourable legislation" pertains to legislative competence, not motives, and found no constitutional breach in the Act's provisions.


d) Residuary Power of Legislation (Article 248) 


  1. Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon 309 (1971) 2 SCC 779


The key issue in the case of Union of India vs. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon was whether Section 24 of the Finance Act, 1969, which amended the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, to include the capital value of agricultural land in net wealth computation, was within Parliament's legislative competence. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice S.M. Sikri, addressed whether this amendment fell under Entry 49 of List II (State List) or was within Parliament's powers under Entry 86 or Entry 97 of List I (Union List) and Article 248 of the Constitution. The Court concluded that the amendment was not a law with respect to Entry 49 List II and was within Parliament's competence, thus reversing the High Court's decision. The appeal was allowed, and the amendment was upheld as constitutional.


e) Parliament’s Power to Legislate in List II (State List) – (Articles 246 (4), 247, 249-253, 352, 356) 

f) Doctrine of Repugnancy (Article 254) 


  1. Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 752


The key issue in the case of Zaverbhai Amaidas vs. The State of Bombay was whether the appellant's conviction under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act was valid, given the jurisdictional conflict between the Bombay Act No. XXXVI of 1947 and the Central Act No. LII of 1950. The appellant, Zaverbhai Amaidas, was convicted for transporting food grains without a permit, and he challenged the jurisdiction of the Resident First Class Magistrate. The Supreme Court, agreeing with the High Court, held that the Central Act No. LII of 1950, being later and covering the same subject matter, prevailed over the Bombay Act under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, thus validating the Magistrate's jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.


  1. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45


The key issue in the case of Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. was the constitutional validity of Section 5(1) and 5(3) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, which imposed a surcharge on dealers with a turnover exceeding Rs. 5 lakhs and prohibited them from passing this surcharge onto consumers. The appellants, Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd., argued that this conflicted with the Central Government's price control orders under the Essential Commodities Act, which allowed passing tax liabilities to consumers. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming the Act's validity, reasoning that the surcharge was an additional sales tax within the state's legislative competence under Entry 54 of List II, and there was no irreconcilable conflict with the Central law. The appeal was dismissed, with the Court relying on the precedent set in S. Kodar v. State of Kerala.


  1. Vijay Kr Sharma v. State of  Karnataka (1990) 2 SCC 562 


The key issue in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. was whether Sections 14 and 20 of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, were rendered void due to repugnancy with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The appellants, Vijay Kumar Sharma and others, challenged the refusal of their applications for contract carriage permits under the 1988 Act, arguing that the Karnataka Act's provisions were inconsistent with the central legislation. The Supreme Court, with differing opinions among the judges, ultimately held by majority that the Karnataka Act's provisions were not void, as the two legislations dealt with different subject matters and did not occupy the same field. The writ petitions were dismissed, affirming the validity of the Karnataka Act's provisions.


  1. State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. (2012) 7 SCC 106 


The Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Kerala and Ors. vs. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. and Ors. addressed whether the Kerala Chitties Act, 1975 became repugnant to the Central Chit Funds Act, 1982 under Article 254(1) of the Constitution. The core issue was whether repugnancy arises upon the enactment of the Central Act or its commencement in the state. The Court held that repugnancy is determined at the time of the law's enactment, not its commencement, and found Section 4(1a) of the Kerala Act void for lack of Presidential assent under Article 254(2). The appeal by the State of Kerala was dismissed, affirming the need for Presidential assent for state laws conflicting with central legislation. 


Topic 8 – Freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse (7 Classes) 

Concept of trade and commerce; scope of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse; fiscal measures; direct and immediate restrictions; regulatory measures; compensatory taxes; restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among states, power of Parliament and state legislatures; state monopoly (Articles 301-307) 


  1. G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1975) 1 SCC 375  


The key issue in the case of G.K. Krishnan and Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. was the constitutional validity of the enhanced motor vehicle tax on omnibuses by the Tamil Nadu government and whether it violated Articles 14 and 301 of the Constitution. The appellants, G.K. Krishnan and others, challenged the tax increase from Rs. 30 to Rs. 100 per seat per quarter, arguing it was discriminatory and restricted trade freedom. The Supreme Court held that the tax was compensatory, not a restriction on trade, and the classification between contract and stage carriages was reasonable. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the tax's validity, with references to precedents like the Automobile Transport case.


  1. Shree Mahavir Oil Mills v. State of J. & K. (1996) 11 SCC 39 


The key issue in the case of Shree Mahavir Oil Mills and Ors. vs. State of J&K and Ors. was whether the exemption of local edible oil manufacturers in Jammu & Kashmir from sales tax, while imposing it on out-of-state manufacturers, violated Articles 301 and 304 of the Indian Constitution, which ensure free trade across states. The appellants, out-of-state manufacturers, argued that this exemption created an unconstitutional trade barrier. The Supreme Court, referencing the precedent set in Video Electronics Private Limited, upheld the High Court's dismissal of the appellants' writ, reasoning that the exemption aimed to protect local industries due to higher production costs and did not constitute unreasonable discrimination. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the state's measure as a valid classification under Article 304.


  1. Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana 357 (2017) 12 SCC 1 


The Supreme Court of India in the case of Jindal Stainless Ltd. and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others addressed the constitutional validity of entry taxes imposed by various states, focusing on whether such taxes violate the right to free trade under Article 301 of the Constitution. The appellants, Jindal Stainless Ltd. and others, challenged the taxes as discriminatory and lacking presidential sanction under Article 304. The Court examined the concept of compensatory taxes, ultimately overruling previous decisions in Bhagatram and Bihar Chamber of Commerce, and reaffirmed the "direct and immediate effect" test from Atiabari and Automobile Transport cases. The matter was remanded to High Courts to determine if the taxes were compensatory, and the appeals were adjourned pending these findings.



Topic 9 – Emergency Provisions

  1. Proclamation of Emergency on grounds of war, external aggression and armed rebellion (Articles 352, 358, 359) 

  2. Power of Union Executive to issue directions (e.g. Articles 256, 257) and the effect of non-compliance (Article 365); Duty of the Union to protect the States against external aggression and internal disturbance (Article 355) 

  3. Imposition of President’s Rule in States – Grounds, Limitations, Parliamentary Control, Judicial Review (Articles 356-357) 

  4. Financial Emergency (Article 360) 


  1. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592


The Supreme Court of India addressed the key issue of whether the Union Government's directive to dissolve state assemblies following the 1977 Lok Sabha elections was constitutional under Article 356. The parties involved were the States of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, and Orissa against the Union of India. The court reasoned that the Union's actions were within the constitutional framework, as Article 356 allows for intervention when a state's governance cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The court dismissed the suits and petitions, emphasizing that the Union's directive did not contravene any constitutional provisions. The judgment did not mandate further actions or cite specific precedents.


  1. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1


The key issue in the case of S.R. Bommai and Ors. vs. Union of India was the constitutional validity and scope of the President's power to impose President's Rule in states under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution. The parties involved were S.R. Bommai and others as appellants, and the Union of India and others as respondents. The Supreme Court emphasized that Article 356 should be used sparingly and only when the President is fully satisfied that the state government cannot function according to constitutional provisions. The court held that the President's satisfaction is subject to judicial review, but only on limited grounds such as mala fides or ultra vires actions. The final disposition was that the matters were disposed of with no order as to costs, and the court underscored the importance of maintaining the constitutional balance between the center and states. The judgment referenced the need for judicial restraint in reviewing the President's satisfaction and highlighted the importance of secularism as a basic feature of the Constitution.


  1. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India,  (2006) 2 SCC 1


The Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutional validity of the dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly before its first meeting, based on the Governor's report alleging attempts to form a government through illegal means. The parties involved were Rameshwar Prasad and others against the Union of India. The Court found the Governor's report lacked verified material and was based on assumptions, making the dissolution unconstitutional. However, due to the advanced stage of election preparations, the Court declined to restore the Assembly, allowing elections to proceed. The judgment emphasized the limited scope of judicial review under Article 356, referencing S.R. Bommai's case.


~The End~

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